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Therefore, the dictates of article IX, section 2(c) of the New

York State Constitution are parallel to that of the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
Walker v. Town of Hempstead 12 78
(decided June 1, 1993)

Plaintiff Walker claimed that defendant Town of Hempstead's
local "notice of defect" law1 2 7 9 was inconsistent with New York

State General Municipal Law section 50-e(4) 1280 and therefore
unconstitutional under the auspices of article IX section 2(c)(ii) of
the New York State Constitution. 1281 The court held that the
1278. 190 A.D.2d 364, 598 N.Y.S.2d 550 (2d Dep't 1993).
1279. LOCAL LAws, 1988 No. 90 of Town of Hempstead. This law states in
pertinent part:
No civil action shall be maintained against the Town of
Hempstead... unless written notice of... the defective, unsafe,
dangerous or obstructed condition of such parking field, beach area,
swimming or wading pool or pool equipment, playground or playground
equipment, skating rink or park property was actually served upon the
Town Clerk ....
Id.
1280. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e(4) (McKinney 1986). Section 50-e
states in pertinent part:
No other or further notice... shall be required as a condition to the
commencement of an action... provided, however, that nothing herein
contained shall be deemed to dispense with the requirement of notice of
the defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition of any street,
highway, bridge, culvert, sidewalk or crosswalk, or the existence of
snow or ice thereon.
Id.
1281. Walker, 190 A.D.2d at 368, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 552; see also N.Y.
CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(ii), which provides in pertinent part: "Every local
government shall have the power to adopt and amend local laws not
inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law....
Id.
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Town of Hempstead was empowered with the right to supersede
section 50-e(4) of the General Municipal Law pursuant to the
New York State Constitution article IX, section 2(c)(ii)(5) 12 82
and (6),1283 but declared Town of Hempstead Code section 6-2
12 84
invalid on non-constitutional grounds.
Plaintiff's claim arose out of an injury suffered on May 17,
1987, while playing paddleball at the Malibu Beach Club, which
was owned by defendant Town of Hempstead. 12 85 In plaintiff's
subsequent personal injury action, defendant moved for summary
judgment pursuant to Town of Hempstead Code section 6-2,
claiming that the Town could not be held liable since it was not
given prior notice of the injury causing the defect. 128 6 Plaintiff
opposed the motion on the basis that the Town's local law was
invalid since it contradicted New York State General Municipal
Law section 50-e(4). 12 87 The crux of plaintiff's argument
centered around the proposition that "all local laws must conform
88
to State laws of general applicability." 12
The court reasoned, however, that "there [were] certain cases
in which local governments may supersede State laws."' 1289
Specifically, the court pointed to New York State Municipal

Home Rule Law section 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) which allows a town
1282. Id. at 369, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 553; see also N.Y. CoNsT. art IX,
§ 2(c)(ii)(5). Section 2(c)(ii)(5) allows local governments to legislate in matters
concerning "the presentation, ascertainment and discharge of claims against
it." Id.
1283. N.Y. CONST. art. IX § 2(c)(ii)(6). Section 2(c)(ii)(6) allows local
governments to legislate in matters concerning "the acquisition, care,
management and use of its highways, streets, avenues and property." Id.
1284. Id. at 374, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 556. The ordinance in question was found
to have violated the provisions of the New York State Municipal Home Rule
Law § 22(1) which requires a local government, when attempting to preempt a
state statute, to at least identify the ordinance it is attempting to supersede. Id.
Due to the fact that the Hempstead Town Ordinance did not identify General
Municipal Law § 50-e(4), the statute which it preempts, the court declared it
invalid. Id.
1285. Id. at 366, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
1286. Id.
1287. Id.
1288. Id. at 368, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
1289. Id.
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1290
government to "supersede the provisions of the Town Law."
Such a right to supersede, the court stated, must be "read in the
context of the general home rule provisions of the New York
State Constitution ... and the parallel provisions of the

Municipal Home Rule Law... in connection with certain
defined subjects ... ."

12 9 1

Based on these relevant provisions of the New York State
Constitution and the New York State Municipal Home Rule Law,
the court was attempting to ascertain "whether the State
Legislature ha[d] expressly prohibited towns from expanding the
class of municipal properties with respect to which notices of
defect may be required beyond those specific types of properties
mentioned in General Municipal Law section 50-e(4). "1292 In an
attempt to analyze the issue at hand, the court turned to recent

case law on the subject.
1 2 93 involved a notice of defect
Zumbo v. Town of Farmington
ordinance which encompassed all town property. 1294 In striking
down- the ordinance as unconstitutional, the Zumbo court
concluded that the New York State Constitution did not allow

1290. Id. Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) "authorizes a town
board by local law to supersede so much of the Town Law § 67 as incorporates
the restrictive provisions of General Municipal Law § 50-e(4) unless it appears
that the Legislature has 'expressly... prohibited such suppression'" Id. at
368-69, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 553 (quoting N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW
§10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 1969)); see also N.Y. TOwN LAwV § 67(1)
(McKinney 1987). Town Law § 67(1) provides: "Any claim... which may
be made against the town... shall be made and served in compliance with
section fifty-e of the general municipal law." Id. Therefore, according to the
Walker court, "General Municipal Law § 50-e(4) applies to towns... by
virtue of Town Law § 67." Walker, 190 A.D.2d at 367, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
1291. Walker, 190 A.D.2d at 369, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 553. The two provisions
at issue here were N.Y. CONST. art. IX § 2(c)(ii)(5) and (6), and parallel
provisions of Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii)(a)(5) and (6).
1292. Id. at 370, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 554. The properties mentioned in General
Municipal Law, § 50-e(4) were limited to streets, highways, bridges, culverts,
sidewalks and crosswalks, whereas section 6-2 of the Hempstead Town Code
attempted to extend coverage to town pools, playgrounds, beaches, skating
rinks and parks. Id.
1293. 60 A.D.2d 350, 401 N.Y.S.2d 121 (4th Dep't 1978).
1294. Id. at 354, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
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local laws to conflict with general law. 12 9 5 The court stated that
the problem with this analysis was that "pursuant to Municipal
Home Rule Law section 10(1)(ii)(d)(3), a local law may conflict
with a general law under certain conditions. ' 1296 However,
Klimek v. Town of Ghent, 12 97 which also involved a notice of
defect law encompassing any town property, opposed Zumbo by

upholding the local law. 1298 Yet, in that decision, the court did
not mention Zumbo or General Municipal Law section 50-e(4),
which conditionally prohibits "local governments from requiring
any 'further notice." 1299
A perusal by the court of more recent case law proved
fruitless, since the "same ambiguities and ... apparent
inconsistencies" which plagued Zumbo and Klimek also surfaced

in subsequent notice of defect causes of action. 1300
Therefore, in reaching its holding, the court "focus[ed]
exclusively on the language of the controlling statutory and

constitutional sources," specifically General Municipal Law
1295. Id. at 355, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
1296. Walker, 190 A.D.2d at 371, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 554; see also Holt v.
Tioga County, 56 N.Y.2d 414, 437 N.E.2d 1140, 452 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1982);
Roller v. Franger, 61 A.D.2d 46, 401 N.Y.S.2d 623 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 46
N.Y.2d 760, 386 N.E.2d 262, 413 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1978).
1297. 71 A.D.2d 359, 423 N.Y.S.2d 517 (3d Dep't 1979).
1298. Id. at 360-61, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
1299. Walker, 190 A.D.2d at 371-72, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
1300. Id. See Barsh v. Town of Union, 126 A.D.2d 311, 513 N.Y.S.2d 875
(3d Dep't 1987) (upholding local notice of defect law which applied to all town
property); Amsterdam Brush Corp. v. City of Amsterdam, 105 A.D.2d 881,
482 N.Y.S.2d 352 (3d Dep't 1984) (upholding local notice of defect law
encompassing "any public place"); Rich v. Town of Queensbury, 88 A.D.2d
1027, 451 N.Y.S.2d 903 (3d Dep't 1982) (holding that notice of defect law
covering any property "owned, operated or maintained by the town" was
constitutional); Canzano v. Town of Gates, 85 A.D.2d 878, 446 N.Y.S.2d 746
(4th Dep't 1981) (upholding notice requirements more restrictive than Town
Law). But see Adams v. Town of Lisbon, 170 A.D.2d 901, 566 N.Y.S.2d 729
(3d Dep't 1991) (holding that General Municipal Law, § 50-e(4) does not
allow for prior notice requirement of traffic control defects); Tyner v. City of
Buffalo, 152 A.D.2d 978, 543 N.Y.S.2d 794 (4th Dep't 1989) (holding that
attempt to expand notice requirements beyond requirements of General
Municipal Law § 50-e(4) unconstitutional).
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section 50-e(4), Town Law section 67 and New York
Constitution article IX, section 2(c)(ii)(5) and (6).1301 In
declaring Hempstead's notice of defect ordinance constitutionally
valid, the court concluded that although Hempstead "is subject to
General Municipal Law section 50-e(4) because of the terms of
Town Law section 67,..... Hempstead has the right to
supersede those provisions of the Town Law, which,... relate

to matters of local concern, such as the presentation of claims
against the town... and the care and management of town
property. ...

"1302

As a result of this decision, unless there is

"any clear expression of legislative intent" to the contrary, towns
are free to enact notice of defect laws which parallel section 6-2
of the Town of Hempstead Code. 1303

1301. 190 A.D.2d at 372, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
1302. Id.
1303. Id. at 373, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
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